Foreign Judgment Enforceability in India & Interim Relief – Sections 13 & 14 CPC
Judgment dated 29.10.2026 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bobay in Commercial Appeal (L) No.20333 of 2026 in Interim Application No.569 of 2026 with Interim Application (L) No.21931 of 2026 of Limited Liability Company Eurochem North-West-2 Vs. Tecnimont S.P. A. (Foreign Company) with connected matter.
There is no difference of opinion between the respective counsel, as regards the understanding revolving around Section 13 and 14, but the moot question for debate is, at what stage the statutory presumption under Section 14 of the Code can be dislodged.
The learned Senior counsel, Mr. Andhyarujina, has vehemently contended before us that once a copy of certified judgment is produced, a mandatory presumption gets triggered, and the Court shall presume that the judgment is passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 13 of CPC do not provide for any presumption but Section 14 prescribe a presumption as regards sub-clause (a) of Section 13, namely that the foreign judgment has been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction but this presumption is a rebuttable one, permitted to be rebutted, when ‘the contrary appears on record’ or ‘it is displaced by proving want of jurisdiction’.
Section 14 creates a presumption and it prescribe that upon the production of any document purported to be a certified copy of a foreign judgment, the Court shall presume that such a judgment was pronounced by a competent jurisdiction and this presumption is available unless the contrary appears from record. Section 14 permit such presumption to exist upon production of certified copy of the judgment though it is permissible to rebut the presumption by proving want of jurisdiction.
We find fallacy in the argument of the appellant as accepting the submission of Mr. Andhyarujina would mean that in every case of foreign judgment placed before an Indian Court, where from a court of reciprocating or non-reciprocating territory, the grant of interim relief would automatically flow, as the presumption is permitted to be rebutted only at the trial stage.
By applying such an interpretation in every case, interim injunction shall automatically follow and this would definitely disrupt the exercise of civil court under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) to assess whether a prima facie case is made out.
Therefore, in the facts of the case, applying the principle laid down in Wander Ltd and Anr Vs. Antox India P Ltd12, we do not find any scope for interference in the decision of the learned Single Judge, who has rightly opined that the judgment of the Arbitrazh Court, Moscow giving rise to doubt and in absence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss being established by EuroChem, an injunction shall not automatically flow. We must also hold that there is no presumption under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the appellant must make out a prima facie case for grant of relief under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of CPC, and since the burden of proving that the Moscow judgment is conclusive lies on the appellant, as Moscow Court is situated in a non-reciprocating territory with the limited presumption under section 14 being available only qua clause (a) of Section 13, which is also rebuttable, and in our view, even at the interim stage, and since the respondent has produced sufficient material to call in question its conclusivity, we find that the learned Single Judge as rightly exercised the discretion available, and refused the injunction as the plaintiff/appellant failed to make out a case under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of CPC.

