Supreme Court Strengthens POSH Act by Broadening “Workplace” Jurisdiction
Judgment dated 10.12.2025 of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.404 of 2024 of Dr. Sohail Malik Vs. Union of India and others
POSH Act and Internal Complaints Committee
The appellant – Officer of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) – was posted as OSD in Central Board of Direct Taxes, Delhi.
IAS Officer working in the Department of Food and Public Distribution filed complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace by the appellant.
In 2024, the charge-sheet was filed.
On 24.5.2023, the ICC under Section 9 of the POSH Act was constituted in the Department of Food and Public Distribution.
The appellant has challenged the jurisdiction of the said ICC.
HELD that Section 11(1) of the POSH Act does not require that the aggrieved woman and the respondent must be working in the same Department. The phrase “service rules applicable” to the delinquent as mentioned in Section 11 shows that he need not be an employee of the same workplace.
- Whether the ICC constituted in one department of the Central Government has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of the Central Government?
- Whether the use of the words ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint was made?
Whether the “respondent” must be an employee of the same workplace of the “aggrieved woman”.
- The taboo around sexual harassment at the workplace and the fear of stigma which may be attached to the aggrieved woman as a consequence of a complaint regarding sexual harassment already poses a massive psychological barrier for the aggrieved women which actively dissuades them from pursuing their remedy in law. In such view of the matter also, the intent of the legislature behind giving such a wide meaning to the word ‘workplace’ to go beyond the bounds of the traditional meaning implying location of the office, cannot be brushed aside by narrow construction of other provisions of the POSH Act. It is for the aforementioned reasons that we are constrained to reject the argument of the Appellant and answer Issues 1 and 2 in the above terms.

