Section 14(2) – Bias – Visit of the Arbitrator to the Stamp Office

By the order dated 28.6.2024, the Arbitrator impounded the Technology Services Agreement dated 22.10.2020 and sent the authenticated copy to the Stamp authorities for stamp duty.  However, the authority insisted for the original agreement.  On 7.8.2024, the Arbitrator visited the office and met the authority and explained the law of Stamp Act.   However, on the insistence of authority the original was sent to the stamp authority, and it was accordingly stamped.

This visit was objected on the ground that the Arbitrator acted like an advocate.

 HELD that the Arbitrator has powers to impound the instrument of arbitration agreement under Section 33 of the Stamp Act.  The Arbitrator could, as a matter of law, compute the duty and penalty payable, certify it, admit the instrument into evidence and send an authenticated copy to the Collector.  An instrument so admitted cannot be called into question on the ground of under-stamping.   It is only under section 58 that in a challenge to the award that the exercise of testing the adequacy can be undertaken again.

 Unlike a Court which has an entire Registry and its administrative officials for interaction with the stamp authorities, the Arbitrator being an adhoc arbitral tribunal did not have such assistance.   In fact, it is a matter of public knowledge that some arbitral tribunals manned by retired Supreme Court Judges have now adopted the laudable practice of appointing a “Tribunal Secretary” to assist the Arbitral Tribunal in matters of case administration as an officer of the Tribunal.   Such officers can handle administrative functions of this nature under the oversight of the Arbitral Tribunal.It was for the Arbitrator to decide what was the best approach in discharging administrative functions.   If impounding is a statutory duty cast on the Arbitrator, having it stamped is also a duty cast upon the learned Arbitrator.

The implication of stamping may be perceived as being adverse but such perception would not render the impeccable conduct of the Arbitrator to be called into question and be the basis of serious insinuation against a quasi judicial officer.   Such insinuation is worthy of deprecation.   Therefore, the ground to call into question the independence and impartiality of the learned Arbitrator is rejected.

It is entirely for the Arbitrator to value and assess the claim and counter claims to determine the fees.